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第一章·政府形式在多大程度上是一个选择

Chapter 1? ? ? ? To what extent Forms of Government are a Matter of Choice.

? ALL SPECULATIONS[思索] concerning forms of government bear the impress, more or less exclusive[排斥], of two conflicting theories respecting political institutions; or, to speak more properly, conflicting conceptions of what political institutions are.? 一切有关政府形式的理论可以归纳为两派学说。这两派学说在关于政治制度的问题上,或者更确切地来说,在关于什么是政治制度的概念问题上,互相冲突甚至可以说互相排斥。

? By some minds, government is conceived[以为] as strictly a practical art, giving rise to no questions but those of means and an end. Forms of government are assimilated[理解] to any other expedients[权宜之计] for the attainment of human objects. They are regarded as wholly an affair of invention and contrivance[发明].? ?在一些人看来,严格地来说,政府是一种门实践艺术,只存在手段和目的的问题。和达到人类目的的其他手段一样,政府的形式被完全看做是一种人为创设的事物。

Being made by man, it is assumed[假定] that man has the choice either to make them or not, and how or on what pattern[形态] they shall be made. Government, according to this conception, is a problem, to be worked like any other question of business.? ?既然是人设计的,人们当然就有权选择是否设置,如何设置以及按照什么模式去设置。按照这种观点,政府应该和任何其他事务问题一样被加以处理对待。

The first step is to define the purposes which governments are required to promote. The next, is to inquire[调查] what form of government is best fitted to fulfil[实现] those purposes. Having satisfied ourselves on these two points, and ascertained[确定] the form of government which combines the greatest amount of good with the least of evil, what further remains is to obtain the concurrence[合作] of our countrymen, or those for whom the institutions are intended, in the opinion which we have privately arrived at.? ?第一步是明确政府所须促进的目的。第二步,是研究什么样的政府形式最适于实现这些目的。在作到了以上这两点之后,并且确保政府形式集最大的善和最小的恶于一身之后,最后一步就是争取国人或者该制度所管辖的人们的同意。

To find the best form of government; to persuade others that it is the best; and having done so, to stir[搅动] them up to insist on having it, is the order of ideas in the minds of those who adopt this view of political philosophy. They look upon a constitution in the same light (difference of scale[刻度] being allowed for) as they would upon a steam plough[犁], or a threshing[脱粒] machine.? 探索最好的政府形式,劝说别人也相信它就是最好的,然后煽动他们坚持要这种制度,就是采取这种政治学观点的人心中的一系列想法。在他们眼中,政体跟汽犁或者打谷机没什么两样。

? To these stand opposed another kind of political reasoners, who are so far from assimilating[理解] a form of government to a machine, that they regard it as a sort of spontaneous[自发] product, and the science of government as a branch (so to speak) of natural history.? ?与他们持相反意见的另一派政治理论家则认为,政府形式是一种自然产物,绝不是什么人的发明。他们把政治科学作为自然史的一个分支来看待。

According to them, forms of government are not a matter of choice. We must take them, in the main, as we find them. Governments cannot be constructed by premeditated[预谋] design. They "are not made, but grow." Our business with them, as with the other facts of the universe, is to acquaint[使熟知] ourselves with their natural properties[性质], and adapt ourselves to them.? ?按照他们的观点,政府形式不是一个选择问题,基本上我们只能按照它们的现实情况加以接受。政府不能靠预先的设计来建立。它们不是做成的,而是长成的。我们对于它们,一如我们对于宇宙中的其他事实一样,所能做的就是熟悉它们的自然特性并使自己适应它们。

The fundamental[基本] political institutions of a people are considered by this school as a sort of organic[有机] growth from the nature and life of that people: a product of their habits, instincts[本能], and unconscious wants and desires, scarcely[几乎不] at all of their deliberate[深思熟虑] purposes.? ?在这一学派看来,一国人民的根本政治制度是从该国人民的特性和生活成长起来的一种有机产物,是他们的习惯、本能和无意识的需要和愿望共同作用的产物,决不是人们刻意为之。

Their will has had no part in the matter but that of meeting the necessities of the moment by the contrivances[发明] of the moment, which contrivances, if in sufficient conformity[一致] to the national feelings and character, commonly last, and by successive aggregation[聚集] constitute a polity, suited to the people who possess it, but which it would be vain to attempt to superduce upon any people whose nature and circumstances had not spontaneously[自发]? evolved it.? 除了用权宜的设计应付一时的需要以外,他们的意志在这问题上不起作用。一种政府形式如果充分符合民族的感情和性格,经过连续不断的凝聚,就构成适合该国人民的政体。如果一国人民的特性和情况未自发地产生某种政府形式,将它强加于他们的任何努力都是徒劳。

? It is difficult to decide which of these doctrines would be the most absurd[荒谬], if we could suppose either of them held as an exclusive theory. But the principles which men profess, on any controverted[辩论] subject, are usually a very incomplete exponent[说明物] of the opinions they really hold. No one believes that every people is capable of working every sort of institutions.? ?很难断言两者中哪一种理论才是最不合理的。但是人们在争论任何问题时所表述的原则通常是他们真正持有的意见的极不完全的代表。没有人会以为每一国人民能够实行任何一种制度。

Carry the analogy[类比] of mechanical[机械] contrivances[发明] as far as we will, a man does not choose even an instrument of timber[木材] and iron on the sole ground that it is in itself the best. 不管我们愿意怎样运用机械装置的类比,就连人们选择一个木的还是铁制的工具也不会仅仅因为它本身是最好的。

He considers whether he possesses the other requisites[要素] which must be combined with it to render[使成为] its employment advantageous, and in particular whether those by whom it will have to be worked possess the knowledge and skill necessary for its management.? ?他必须考虑自己是否具有使这种工具的使用变得对自己有利而必须同时具备的其他条件,特别是使用该工具的人是否具有管理工具所必要的知识和技能。

On the other hand, neither are those who speak of institutions as if they were a kind of living organisms really the political fatalists[宿命论者] they give themselves out to be. They do not pretend that mankind have absolutely no range of choice as to the government they will live under, or that a consideration of the consequences which flow from different forms of polity is no element at all in deciding which of them should be preferred.? ?另一方面,把制度说成好象是活的有机体的人们,也并不真的是他们自称的政治宿命论者。他们并不妄称人类对于他们将生活在其下的政府绝无选择的余地,或者妄称对由不同政体形式产生的后果的考虑全然不是决定选择哪种形式的一个因素。

But though each side greatly exaggerates[夸张] its own theory, out of opposition to the other, and no one holds without modification to either, the two doctrines correspond[符合] to a deep-seated difference between two modes of thought; and though it is evident that neither of these is entirely in the right, yet it being equally evident that neither is wholly in the wrong, we must endeavour[努力] to get down to what is at the root of each, and avail[帮助] ourselves of the amount of truth which exists in either.? 尽管每一方为了反对另一方都大大夸大了自己的学说,而且没有人抱有不对两种学说都作些修正的意见,但是这两种学说在彼此的思想方法上存在着根深蒂固的分歧。尽管两者中任何一个显然都不是完全正确,但两者中任何一个显然也不是完全错误。我们必须努力认真考虑两者的根本立足点,并利用两者中含有的全部真理。

? Let us remember, then, in the first place, that political institutions (however the proposition may be at times ignored) are the work of men; owe their origin and their whole existence to human will. 我们首先要记住,政治制度是人的创作。它们的根源和全部存在均有赖于人的意志。

Men did not wake on a summer morning and find them sprung up. Neither do they resemble[相似] trees, which, once planted, "are aye[肯定] growing" while men "are sleeping." In every stage of their existence they are made what they are by human voluntary agency.? 并不是人们在某个夏日的清晨一觉醒来,发现它们已经长成了。它们也不象树木那样,一旦种下去就会自己成长,而人们却在呼呼大睡。在它们存在的每一阶段,它们的存在都是人的意志力作用的结果。

Like all things, therefore, which are made by men, they may be either well or ill made; judgment and skill may have been exercised in their production, or the reverse[相反] of these.? ?所以,它们象一切由人做成的东西那样,或者做得好,或者做得不好。在它们的制作过程中,可能运用了判断和技能,也可能情况相反。

And again, if a people have omitted[疏忽], or from outward pressure have not had it in their power, to give themselves a constitution by the tentative[暂时] process of applying a corrective to each evil as it arose, or as the sufferers gained strength to resist[抵抗] it, this retardation[妨碍] of political progress is no doubt a great disadvantage to them, but it does not prove that what has been found good for others would not have been good also for them, and will not be so still when they think fit to adopt it.? 又或者,如果一国人民出于疏忽而未能,或者由于外来压力而无权,通过试验性方法——即当邪恶发生时,或当受害者有力量反抗时,对每一种邪恶进行矫正的方法——为他们自己发展出一种政体,这种政治进步方面的阻滞对他们说来无疑是巨大的不利,但不因此证明对别国人民是好的东西对他们就不会也是好的,以及当他们认为适于采用时仍然不是好的。

? On the other hand, it is also to be borne in mind that political machinery does not act of itself. As it is first made, so it has to be worked, by men, and even by ordinary men. It needs, not their simple acquiescence[默许], but their active participation; and must be adjusted to the capacities and qualities of such men as are available.? ?另一方面,还须记住政治机器并不自行运转。正如它最初是由人制成的,同样还须由人,甚至由平庸的人去操作。它需要的不是人们单纯的默从,而是人们积极的参加;并须使之适应现有人们的能力和特点。

This implies three conditions. The people for whom the form of government is intended must be willing to accept it; or at least not so unwilling as to oppose an insurmountable[不能克服] obstacle[阻碍] to its establishment. They must be willing and able to do what is necessary to keep it standing. And they must be willing and able to do what it requires of them to enable it to fulfil its purposes.? ?这包含着三个条件。为人民而设的政府形式必须为人民所乐意接受,或至少不是不乐意到对其建立设置不可逾越的障碍;他们必须愿意并能够为了使它持续下去做所必要的事情;以及他们必须愿意并能够为了使它能实现其目的而做需要他们做的事情。

The word "do" is to be understood as including forbearances[克制] as well as acts. They must be capable of fulfilling the conditions of action, and the conditions of self-restraint, which are necessary either for keeping the established polity in existence, or for enabling it to achieve the ends, its conduciveness[有助] to which forms its recommendation[可贵之处].? “做”这个字应理解为既包括作为也包括不作为。他们必须能满足行为的条件和自我克制的条件,这些条件不论是对保持既定的政体存在,还是对使它能达到目的都是必要的。政体有助于这些目的就是这个政体的长处。

? The failure of any of these conditions renders[提出] a form of government, whatever favourable promise it may otherwise hold out, unsuitable to the particular case.??这些条件中任何一个条件不具备,就使政府的形式变得不适合于特定情况,不管它显得多么有希望。

? The first obstacle, the repugnance[深恶痛绝] of the people to the particular form of government, needs little illustration[解释], because it never can in theory have been overlooked. The case is of perpetual[长期] occurrence.? ?第一个障碍,即人民不想要某种政府形式。这一点其实不需作太多的说明,因为这在理论上从来没有被忽略过。这种情况是不断发生的。

Nothing but foreign force would induce[劝诱] a tribe[部落] of North American Indians to submit to the restraints of a regular and civilised government. The same might have been said, though somewhat less absolutely, of the barbarians[野蛮人] who overran the Roman Empire.? ?只有外来的暴力才能劝使一个北美印第安人部落服从正规的文明政府的限制。对蹂躏罗马帝国的野蛮人也可以这么说,尽管不那么肯定。

It required centuries of time, and an entire change of circumstances, to discipline[训练] them into regular obedience even to their own leaders, when not actually serving under their banner[旗帜]. There are nations who will not voluntarily submit to any government but that of certain families, which have from time immemorial[久远] had the privilege of supplying them with chiefs.? ?要把他们驯服,即使是服从他们自己的领袖(当他们不是直接服役于该领袖的旗帜下的时候),往往需要有几个世纪的时间和整个社会环境的变化。有些民族除服从某些家族的政府外不愿服从任何政府,这些家族从远古时候起就享有为他们提供头领的特权。

Some nations could not, except by foreign conquest, be made to endure a monarchy[君主集权制]; others are equally averse[反对] to a republic. The hindrance[阻碍] often amounts, for the time being, to impracticability.? 有些民族,除了靠外国征服,不能使之容忍君主制;另外一些民族则同样不喜欢共和制。这种障碍常常达到一时无法克服的地步。

? But there are also cases in which, though not averse to a form of government- possibly even desiring it- a people may be unwilling or unable to fulfil its conditions. They may be incapable of fulfilling such of them as are necessary to keep the government even in nominal[名义上] existence.? ?但是还有这样一些场合,一国人民虽不反对——甚至可能想望——一种政府形式,但不愿意或不能够满足该政府形式所须具备的条件。他们可能连保持政府名义上的存在所必要的条件也无力满足。

Thus a people may prefer a free government, but if, from indolence[懒散], or carelessness, or cowardice[胆怯], or want of public spirit, they are unequal to the exertions[发挥] necessary for preserving it; if they will not fight for it when it is directly attacked; if they can be deluded[蒙蔽] by the artifices[阴谋] used to cheat them out of it;? ?比方说,一国人民可能情愿要自由政府,但是如果由于懒惰,或是不关心,或是怯懦,或是缺乏公共精神,他们和保持这种制度所必要的努力不相称;如果当该项制度遭到直接攻击时他们不为它而斗争;如果他们能被阴谋诡计所骗脱离这种制度;

if by momentary[暂时] discouragement[灰心丧气], or temporary[暂时] panic, or a fit of enthusiasm[热情] for an individual, they can be induced[劝诱] to lay their liberties at the feet even of a great man, or trust him with powers which enable him to subvert[毁灭] their institutions; in all these cases they are more or less unfit for liberty: and though it may be for their good to have had it even for a short time, they are unlikely long to enjoy it.? ?如果由于一时的沮丧,或是暂时的惊慌失措,或是对某个人的一时狂热,他们能被诱使将自己的自由奉献于即使是一个伟大人物的脚下,或者托付给他以足够破坏他们的制度的权力。在所有这些场合,他们多少是和自由不相适合的。即使在短期内有了这种制度也可能对他们是有好处的,但他们未必能长期享有这种制度。

Again, a people may be unwilling or unable to fulfil the duties which a particular form of government requires of them. A rude people, though in some degree alive to the benefits of civilised society, may be unable to practise the forbearance[克制] which it demands: their passions may be too violent, or their personal pride too exacting, to forego[forgo放弃] private conflict, and leave to the laws the avenging[惩罚] of their real or supposed wrongs.? ?此外,一国人民可能不愿意或不能够履行特定的政府形式所要求于他们的义务。一个未开化的民族,尽管在某种程度上感觉到文明社会的好处,也许不能实行它所要求的克制:他们也许太容易动感情,或者他们的个人自尊心太强,而不能放弃私斗,把对事实上的或者所认为的不法行为的报复留给法律去解决。

In such a case, a civilised government, to be really advantageous to them, will require to be in a considerable degree despotic[专制]: to be one over which they do not themselves exercise control, and which imposes a great amount of forcible restraint upon their actions.? 在这种场合,一个文明政府要对他们真正有利,将必须是在相当程度上专制的,即必须是一个他们自己无法实行控制,却对他们的行动加以大量强制的政府。

? Again, a people must be considered unfit for more than a limited and qualified freedom, who will not co-operate actively with the law and the public authorities in the repression[压制] of evil-doers. A people who are more disposed to shelter a criminal than to apprehend[逮捕] him; who, like the Hindoos, will perjure[作伪证] themselves to screen the man who has robbed them, rather than take trouble or expose themselves to vindictiveness[复仇] by giving evidence against him;? 一国人民如不愿积极地和法律及公共当局合作镇压作恶的人,就应被看作仅仅适于有限制的自由。更有意庇护罪犯而无意逮捕罪犯的人民;象印度人那样,他们宁愿用伪证来庇护曾抢劫过他们的人,而不愿不怕麻烦或挺身而出进行报复,提出犯罪人的罪证;?

who, like some nations of Europe down to a recent date, if a man poniards[短剑] another in the public street, pass by on the other side, because it is the business of the police to look to the matter, and it is safer not to interfere in what does not concern them; a people who are revolted[反叛] by an execution, but not shocked at an assassination require that the public authorities should be armed with much sterner powers of repression than elsewhere, since the first indispensable[不可缺少] requisites[必需] of civilised life have nothing else to rest on.? ?象直到近日为止的某些欧洲民族那样,若有人在大街上捅死另一个人,他们袖手走过,因为这是警察的事情,事不关己以不干预为妙;对执行死刑有反感但对暗杀却不感到震惊的人民,需要公共当局握有比别的地方严厉得多的镇压权力,因为文明生活的首要条件除此以外别无可依靠。

These deplorable[可怜] states of feeling, in any people who have emerged[出现] from savage[野生] life, are, no doubt, usually the consequence of previous bad government, which has taught them to regard the law as made for other ends than their good, and its administrators as worse enemies than those who openly violate it.? ?民心的这种可悲状态,在刚脱离野蛮生活的民族,无疑通常是以前的坏政府的恶果,教给他们把法律看做是为了其他的目的而不是为了他们的利益制定的,以及法律的执行者是比公然违反法律的人更坏的敌人。

But however little blame may be due to those in whom these mental habits have grown up, and however the habits may be ultimately conquerable[可战胜] by better government, yet while they exist a people so disposed[处理] cannot be governed with as little power exercised over them as a people whose sympathies[同情] are on the side of the law, and who are willing to give active assistance in its enforcement.? ?但是,尽管对养成这种心理习惯的人们不能多所责备,尽管这种习惯最终可以由较好的政府克服,然而当这些习惯存在时,一个有这种倾向的民族,就不能象对法律具有同情并愿积极协助其贯彻施行的民族那样,受到那么少的权力统治。

Again, representative institutions are of little value, and may be a mere instrument of tyranny[专制] or intrigue[阴谋], when the generality[大多数] of electors are not sufficiently interested in their own government to give their vote, or, if they vote at all, do not bestow[应用] their suffrages[选举权] on public grounds, but sell them for money, or vote at the beck of some one who has control over them, or whom for private reasons they desire to propitiate[安抚]. Popular election thus practised, instead of a security against misgovernment, is but an additional wheel in its machinery.? 此外,当大多数选民对选举自己的政府缺乏足够的关心,或虽去投票,却不把选举权用于公共的理由,而是为金钱而出卖选票,或者按照控制着自己的人或出于私人原因希望谋求其好感的人的意思投票时,代议制度就没有多大价值,并可能成为苛政或阴谋的单纯工具。这样实行的普选,不是防止苛政的保证,而是为虎添翼。

? Besides these moral hindrances[阻碍], mechanical difficulties are often an insuperable[难以克服] impediment[妨碍] to forms of government. In the ancient world, though there might be, and often was, great individual or local independence, there could be nothing like a regulated popular government beyond the bounds of a single city-community; because there did not exist the physical conditions for the formation and propagation[蔓延] of a public opinion, except among those who could be brought together to discuss public matters in the same agora[广场].? ?除了这些精神上的窒碍以外,技术上的困难也常常是政府形式不可克服的障碍。在古代世界,尽管可能有,也常常有过伟大的个人自主或地方自主,但不可能有超越单个城市社会界限的有秩序的平民政府之类的东西。因为除了在可以把讨论公共事务的人们召集到同一广场之外,不存在形成和传播舆论的其他手段。

This obstacle is generally thought to have ceased by the adoption of the representative system. But to surmount[克服] it completely, required the press, and even the newspaper press, the real equivalent[相等], though not in all respects an adequate[足够] one, of the Pnyx and the Forum.? ?一般认为通过采用代议制度,这一障碍就不复存在了。但是要完全克服这个障碍,就需要有出版物,甚至新闻报纸,这是和古雅典及古罗马集会的广场真正同等的东西。

There have been states of society in which even a monarchy[君主集权制] of any great territorial[领土] extent could not subsist[继续存在], but unavoidably broke up into petty principalities[公国/诸侯国], either mutually independent, or held together by a loose tie like the feudal[封建]: because the machinery of authority was not perfect enough to carry orders into effect at a great distance from the person of the ruler.? ?有过这样的社会情况:甚至一个具有较大领土的君主国也不能继续维持其存在,而不可避免地分裂为几个小公国,或是彼此独立,或是由一种象封建关系那样的松散的纽带维系在一起。因为权力机器尚未足够完善到把命令传递到很远的地方。

He depended mainly upon voluntary fidelity[忠诚] for the obedience even of his army, nor did there exist the means of making the people pay an amount of taxes sufficient for keeping up the force necessary to compel obedience throughout a large territory. In these and all similar cases, it must be understood that the amount of the hindrance[阻碍] may be either greater or less.? ?甚至统治者军队的服从也主要依靠其自愿的效忠,也没有向人民征收足够的税款来组建军队的手段用以维持在整个幅员广大领土内的服从。在这些以及一切类似的场合,障碍总是或多或少的存在着。

It may be so great as to make the form of government work very ill, without absolutely precluding[排除] its existence, or hindering[妨碍] it from being practically preferable[偏爱] to any other which can be had. This last question mainly depends upon a consideration which we have not yet arrived at —?the tendencies of different forms of government to promote Progress.? 这些障碍可以大到把政府形式逼入绝境,甚至被废止或用其他的形式取代的地步。最后的问题取决于我们尚未谈及的一种考虑,那就是不同的政府形式促进进步的倾向

? We have now examined the three fundamental conditions of the adaptation of forms of government to the people who are to be governed by them. If the supporters of what may be termed the naturalistic theory of politics, mean but to insist on the necessity of these three conditions; if they only mean that no government can permanently exist which does not fulfil the first and second conditions, and, in some considerable measure, the third; their doctrine, thus limited, is incontestable[无可争辩]. Whatever they mean more than this appears to me untenable[难于防守].? ?我们刚才已经考察了政府形式适应于受它统治的人民的三个根本条件。如果可以称之为自然主义政治学说的支持者们的意思只是要坚持这三个条件的必要性,如果他们的意思只是说,凡不能满足第一和第二条件,以及在相当程度上满足第三个条件的政府,不能永久存在,则他们的学说,经这样限定以后,就是无可争辩的。超出这个范围,在我看来就是站不住脚的。

All that we are told about the necessity of an historical basis for institutions, of their being in harmony[调和] with the national usages and character, and the like, means either this, or nothing to the purpose. There is a great quantity of mere sentimentality[多愁善感] connected with these and similar phrases, over and above the amount of rational meaning contained in them. But, considered practically, these alleged[宣称] requisites of political institutions are merely so many facilities[资质] for realising the three conditions.? ?一切关于制度必须有历史的基础,制度必须和民族惯例和性格和谐一致,以及如此等等的说法,要不就是指这一点说的,要不就是不得要领的。与这些类似语句相联系的超出它们所包含的合理涵义的纯粹感情用事是大量存在的。但是,从实际上考虑,这些所谓的政治制度的必要条件,不过是实现上述三个条件的诸多便利罢了。

When an institution, or a set of institutions, has the way prepared for it by the opinions, tastes, and habits of the people, they are not only more easily induced to accept it, but will more easily learn, and will be, from the beginning, better disposed[布置], to do what is required of them both for the preservation of the institutions, and for bringing them into such action as enables them to produce their best results. It would be a great mistake in any legislator not to shape his measures so as to take advantage of such pre-existing habits and feelings when available.? ?当一项制度,或一套制度,具有民族的舆论、爱好和习惯为它铺平的道路时,人民就不仅更易于接受,而且更容易学会,并从一开始就更倾向于去做需要他们做的事情,以维护这种制度,并把它付诸实施,以便产生最好的结果。任何一个立法者在考虑措施时不利用这种现存的习惯和感情,将是一个重大的错误。

On the other hand, it is an exaggeration[夸大] to elevate these mere aids and facilities[资质] into necessary conditions. People are more easily induced to do, and do more easily, what they are already used to; but people also learn to do things new to them. Familiarity is a great help; but much dwelling[居住] on an idea will make it familiar, even when strange at first. There are abundant[大量] instances in which a whole people have been eager for untried things.? ?另一方面,把这些单纯的帮助和便利上升为必要的条件则是一种夸大。人民更容易被诱导也更熟练做他们已经习惯的事情;但是人民也会学着去做对他们说来是新的事情。熟悉是一大帮助;但是一种观点,即使起初是陌生的,如果多想想,也会对它熟悉起来。全体人民热中于未经试过的新事物的例子是很多的。

The amount of capacity which a people possess for doing new things, and adapting themselves to new circumstances; is itself one of the elements of the question. It is a quality in which different nations, and different stages of civilisation, differ much from one another. The capability of any given people for fulfilling the conditions of a given form of government cannot be pronounced[宣告] on by any sweeping rule. Knowledge of the particular people, and general practical judgment and sagacity[智慧], must be the guides.??一国人民做新事情和适应新情况的能力大小本身是这问题的重要因素。这种特质使不同的民族在不同的文明阶段彼此有很大差别。不能用一条总括的法则来判定特定民族满足特定政府形式的条件的能力。特定民族的知识水平,和一般的实际判断力和才智,无疑可以作为指导。

? There is also another consideration not to be lost sight of. A people may be unprepared for good institutions; but to kindle[点燃] a desire for them is a necessary part of the preparation. To recommend[推荐] and advocate[拥护] a particular institution or form of government, and set its advantages in the strongest light, is one of the modes, often the only mode within reach, of educating the mind of the nation not only for accepting or claiming, but also for working, the institution.? ?还有不应忽略的另一种考虑。一国人民也许对好的制度缺乏思想准备,但为他们点燃一种希望就是这种准备的一个必要部分。推荐和拥护特定的制度或政府形式,并把它的优点突出出来,就是不仅为了使人民接受或要求这个制度,而且为了实行这个制度而对民族进行思想教育的方法之一,并往往是能够采取的唯一方法。

What means had Italian patriots[爱国者], during the last and present generation, of preparing the Italian people for freedom in unity, but by inciting[刺激] them to demand itThose, however, who undertake such a task, need to be duly impressed, not solely with the benefits of the institution or polity which they recommend[推荐], but also with the capacities, moral, intellectual, and active, required for working it; that they may avoid, if possible, stirring up a desire too much in advance of the capacity.??在上一代和这一代中,意大利的爱国者们为了给意大利人民作自由统一的准备,除了煽动他们去要求自由统一外还有什么方法呢?然而,担负这样一种任务的人们,不仅要适当记住这制度或政体的好处,而且要记住为实行这制度所需要的道德上的、智力上的和积极行动的能力。还须记住要尽可能避免煽起超出这种能力的过高要求。

? The result of what has been said is, that, within the limits set by the three conditions so often adverted to, institutions and forms of government are a matter of choice. To inquire into the best form of government in the abstract (as it is called) is not a chimerical[空想], but a highly practical employment of scientific intellect; and to introduce into any country the best institutions which, in the existing state of that country, are capable of, in any tolerable[忍受] degree, fulfilling the conditions, is one of the most rational objects to which practical effort can address itself.? ?以上所论的结果是,在反复提到的三个条件所规定的界限内,制度和政府形式是个选择问题。抽象地研究最好的政府形式并不是空想,而是对科学智能的高度的实际运用;而把最好的制度引进一个国家,是实际努力所能专心致志的最合理的目标之一,只要在这个国家的现有状况下这种制度能够在相当程度上满足这些条件。

Everything which can be said by way of disparaging[轻视] the efficacy[效力] of human will and purpose in matters of government might be said of it in every other of its applications. In all things there are very strict limits to human power. It can only act by wielding[有效运用] some one or more of the forces of nature. Forces, therefore, that can be applied to the desired use must exist; and will only act according to their own laws. We cannot make the river run backwards; but we do not therefore say that watermills "are not made, but grow."? ?凡可以作为贬低人的意志和目的在政府问题上的效能说的话,也可能在其应用的其他方面这样说。在一切事情上,人的力量是有很严格的局限的。它只有靠掌握某个或更多的自然力量才能起作用。所以,可以应用于所希望的用途的力量无疑是存在的;这种力量将仅仅按照它本身的法则起作用。我们不能使河水倒流;但我们并不因此就说水车“不是做成的而是长成的”。

In politics, as in mechanics, the power which is to keep the engine going must be sought for outside the machinery; and if it is not forthcoming[现成], or is insufficient to surmount[克服] the obstacles which may reasonably be expected, the contrivance will fail. This is no peculiarity[特征] of the political art; and amounts only to saying that it is subject to the same limitations and conditions as all other arts.??在政治学上,和在机械学上一样,发动引擎的力量必须于机器以外求之;如果找不到,或是不足以克服可以合理地预期的障碍,则发明就告失败。这不是政治艺术的什么特殊之处;这只等于说政治艺术服从和其他一切技艺同样的限制和条件。

? At this point we are met by another objection, or the same objection in a different form. The forces, it is contended, on which the greater political phenomena[现象] depend, are not amenable[顺从] to the direction of politicians or philosophers. The government of a country, it is affirmed, is, in all substantial[重要] respects, fixed and determined beforehand[预先] by the state of the country in regard to the distribution of the elements of social power.? ?在这里我们碰到另一种异议,或者同一种异议的不同表达。他们争论说,大的政治现象所依赖的力量并不听从政治家或哲学家的指挥。他们断言,一国的政府,在一切实质性方面,是由这个国家关于社会力量成份的分布状况预先确定和决定的。

Whatever is the strongest power in society will obtain the governing authority; and a change in the political constitution cannot be durable[持久] unless preceded[在先] or accompanied by an altered distribution of power in society itself. A nation, therefore, cannot choose its form of government. The mere details, and practical organisation, it may choose; but the essence of the whole, the seat of the supreme power, is determined for it by social circumstances.??社会中最强大的力量将取得统治的权力;并且,除非先有或伴随有在社会本身中的权力分配上的变化,政治结构中的变动是不能持久的。因此,一个国家不能选择它的政府形式。它可以选择的只不过是细节和实际的组织;但整体的实质,最高权力的中心,是由社会情况为它决定的。

? That there is a portion[部分] of truth in this doctrine I at once admit; but to make it of any use, it must be reduced[减少] to a distinct expression and proper limits. When it is said that the strongest power in society will make itself strongest in the government, what is meant by powerNot thews[体力] and sinews[强力]; otherwise pure democracy would be the only form of polity that could exist.? ?这个学说中有部分的真理,这点我可以马上承认;但要使它变为有用,就必须使它成为一种明确的说法并给以适当的限度。当它说社会中的最强大力量将变成政府中的最强大力量时,力量指什么而言呢?不是指体力;否则纯粹的民主政治就会是唯一能够存在的政体形式了。

To mere muscular[肌肉] strength, add two other elements, property and intelligence, and we are nearer the truth, but far from having yet reached it. Not only is a greater number often kept down by a less, but the greater number may have a preponderance[优势] in property, and individually in intelligence, and may yet be held in subjection, forcibly or otherwise, by a minority in both respects inferior[较差] to it. To make these various elements of power politically influential they must be organised; and the advantage in organisation is necessarily with those who are in possession of the government.? ?在单纯的膂力以外加上两个其他因素即财产和智慧,我们就更接近真理,但还远未达到真理。不仅多数常常受到少数的压制,而且多数也许在财产上占优势,在个人的智慧方面也占优势,但仍然可以被在这两方面都不如它的少数用强迫的或其他的方法加以压服。要使这些不同的力量因素在政治上有影响,就必须把它们组织起来;而掌握政府的那些人必然在组织方面居于有利地位。

A much weaker party in all other elements of power may greatly preponderate[占优势] when the powers of government are thrown into the scale; and may long retain its predominance[优势] through this alone: though, no doubt, a government so situated[处于] is in the condition called in mechanics unstable equilibrium[均衡], like a thing balanced on its smaller end, which, if once disturbed, tends more and more to depart from, instead of reverting[回复] to, its previous state.? 当政府的权力被抛入天平盘时,在其他一切力量因素方面弱得多的一方可能大大占优势;并可能仅仅由于这一点而长期保持优势,尽管政府无疑是处在机械学上叫做不稳定的平衡状态中,象用较小的一头倒立着的东西那样,一旦被干扰,就失去平衡,越来越离开以前的状态,而不是恢复到以前的状态。

? But there are still stronger objections to this theory of government in the terms in which it is usually stated. The power in society which has any tendency to convert itself into political power is not power quiescent[静止], power merely passive[默许], but active power; in other words, power actually exerted[运用]; that is to say, a very small portion of all the power in existence.? ?但是对于通常所说的这一政府学说还存在更强烈的异议。倾向于转变成政治力量的社会力量,不是静止的力量,不是纯粹消极的力量,而是积极的力量;换言之,是实际上发挥出来的力量;也就是说,所有现存力量的一个很小的部分。

Politically speaking, a great part of all power consists in will. How is it possible, then, to compute the elements of political power, while we omit from the computation anything which acts on the willTo think that because those who wield[挥] the power in society wield in the end that of government, therefore it is of no use to attempt to influence the constitution of the government by acting on opinion, is to forget that opinion is itself one of the greatest active social forces.? ?从政治上说,所有力量的一大部分在于意志。因此,如果我们在估计中忽略掉任何按照意志行动的东西,我们又怎样可能估计政治力量的因素呢?认为由于在社会中掌握权力的人到头来也掌握政府的权力,因此企图靠影响社会舆论来影响政府的构成方式是徒然的这种看法,就是忘记了舆论本身就是一种最大的积极社会力量。

One person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests. They who can succeed in creating a general persuasion that a certain form of government, or social fact of any kind, deserves to be preferred, have made nearly the most important step which can possibly be taken towards ranging the powers of society on its side. On the day when the proto[最早]-martyr[殉道者] was stoned to death at Jerusalem[耶路撒冷], while he who was to be the Apostle[门徒] of the Gentiles[基督徒] stood by "consenting unto his death," would any one have supposed that the party of that stoned man were then and there the strongest power in societyAnd has not the event proved that they were so?? ?一个有信仰的人和九十九个仅仅有利益的人是同等的社会力量。凡能成功地形成这样一种普遍信念即认为某种政府形式,或任何一种社会事实,值得选择的人,就朝着纠集社会力量到它一边迈出了可能采取的几乎是最重要的一步。当第一个殉教者在耶路撒冷被人用石头打死,而后来成为基督的使徒的那个人却站在“同意他的死”一方的那一天,有谁会认为被打死的那个人的一派彼时彼地是社会中最强大的力量呢?后来的事件不是已经证明他们是那样吗?

Because theirs was the most powerful of then existing beliefs. The same element made a monk[修道士] of Wittenberg, at the meeting of the Diet of Worms, a more powerful social force than the Emperor Charles the Fifth, and all the princes there assembled. But these, it may be said, are cases in which religion was concerned, and religious convictions are something peculiar in their strength. Then let us take a case purely political, where religion, so far as concerned at all, was chiefly on the losing side.? ?因为他们的信仰是当时存在的最强有力的信仰。同样的因素使威顿伯格的一名僧人在沃尔姆斯会议的议席上变成比查理五世皇帝,以及在那里集会的所有君主更为强大的社会力量。但这些,也许可以说,是涉及宗教的事例,而宗教信仰在其力量方面是有些特殊的。那末让我们举一个纯粹政治的例子,在这例子中,就宗教说它主要处于不利的一方。

If any one requires to be convinced that speculative[深思熟虑] thought is one of the chief elements of social power, let him bethink himself of the age in which there was scarcely a throne in Europe which was not filled by a liberal and reforming king, a liberal and reforming emperor, or, strangest of all, a liberal and reforming pope; the age of Frederic the Great, of Catherine the Second, of Joseph the Second, of Peter Leopold, of Benedict XIV., of Ganganelli, of Pombal, of Aranda; when the very Bourbons of Naples were liberals and reformers, and all the active minds among the noblesse of France were filled with the ideas which were soon after to cost them so dear. Surely a conclusive example how far mere physical and economic power is from being the whole of social power.? 如果还有人不相信纯理论的思想是社会力量的主要因素之一的话,让他回想一下那个时代吧,那时欧洲几乎高踞宝座上的不是自由主义的和主张改革的国王,就是自由主义的和主张改革的皇帝,更奇怪的是,还有自由主义的和主张改革的教皇;弗雷德里克大帝年代,凯瑟琳二世年代,约瑟夫二世年代,彼得·利奥波德年代,本尼迪克特十四世年代,甘加内里、庞巴尔、阿兰达年代;当时那不勒斯的波旁王室本身是自由派和改革者,而法国贵族中的所有积极活动的人士都充满着后来不久就要使他们付出极高昂代价的观点。这的确是关于单纯体力和经济力量远远不是社会力量的全部的一个带结论性的例子。

? It was not by any change in the distribution of material interests, but by the spread of moral convictions, that negro slavery has been put an end to in the British Empire and elsewhere. The serfs[农奴] in Russia owe their emancipation[解放], if not to a sentiment of duty, at least to the growth of a more enlightened opinion respecting the true interest of the State.? 黑人奴隶制在英帝国和其他地方的宣告结束,靠的不是物质利益分配上的任何变化,而是道德信念的传播。俄国农奴的获得解放,如果不是有赖于一种责任感,至少也得感谢逐渐形成的有关国家真正利益的更为开明的舆论。?

It is what men think that determines how they act; and though the persuasions[说服] and convictions of average men are in a much greater degree determined by their personal position than by reason, no little power is exercised over them by the persuasions and convictions of those whose personal position is different, and by the united authority of the instructed.? ?这就是人们认为决定他们怎样行动的东西。尽管普通人的信仰和信念在很大程度上决定于他们的个人地位而不是决定于理性,但具有不同的个人地位的人们的信仰和信念,以及受有教育的人们联合起来的权威,对普通人施加的影响是不小的。

When, therefore, the instructed in general can be brought to recognise one social arrangement, or political or other institution, as good, and another as bad, one as desirable, another as condemnable[该受谴责], very much has been done towards giving to the one, or withdrawing from the other, that preponderance[优势] of social force which enables it to subsist.? ?所以,当受有教育的人们能一般地被导致承认一种社会安排,或者一种政治制度或其他的制度是好的,而另一种是坏的,前者是值得想望的,后者则是应受谴责的时候,那就已经朝着把足以使之存在下去的社会力量的优势给予前者,或者不给予后者方面作了不少工作了。

And the maxim[基本原理], that the government of a country is what the social forces in existence compel it to be, is true only in the sense in which it favours, instead of discouraging, the attempt to exercise, among all forms of government practicable in the existing condition of society, a rational choice.??一国政府决定于现存社会力量的这个原理只有在下述意义上是正确的:它有利于而不是不利于试图对现存社会条件下一切可行的政府形式进行合理的选择。


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