再推荐一次《Theory and Reality》。作者说，在科研有效进行的时期，科学家们通常不怎么关注科学哲学和科学史，但是在科学危机的时期，科学家们趋向于急切地从科学哲/史学中为关于科学的疑问寻找解答。我想对于个人来说也是这样。科学研究是否可以被区分为中规中矩的缝补工作和改变范式的伟大研究？科学是对可观察世界的描述性建模，还是揭示世界运行的深层规律？什么样的研究是有意义的？科研系统是否能够支持科学的发生？我在笔记中着重整理了Khun、LakatosLaudan等人对于paradigm、research programs、research traditions等的看法，相信每一个曾经或现在剑指青云的“科研愤青”都会有所触动，帮助我们更长久地享受科研。另外，了解16-18世纪的科学革命、20世纪中分子生物学开启的生命科学革命，在这些伟大的养分中传承和参与，对于科学家来说本来就是一个不可错过的奖励。
Chapter 1 Introduction
The “science wars” in the late twentieth century
The exemplary scienceTheoretic physicsAre economics and psychology sciences
The Latin word “scientia” – the origin of “science”- referredto the results of logical demonstrations that revealed general and necessarytruths.
The epistemological and metaphysical issues of science
The major argument of the book (Pg7): If looking for arecipe is too simplistic, and looking for a logical theory is too abstract,what might we look for insteadHere is an answer that will be graduallydeveloped as the book goes on: we can try to describe the scientific strategyfor investigating the world.
The scientific revolution (1550-1770): Copernicus &instrumentalism; William Harvey & mechanism. The period ended with Newton’spublication ofPrincipia. Lavoisier and the Chemical Revolution. Linnaeusand the development of modern biology.
Chapter 5 Khun and Normal Science
An exemplar is the key part of a paradigm. Normal science =work that occurs within the framework provide by a paradigm.
One paradigm per field per time
The logical empiricists made a sharp distinction betweenquestions about the history and psychology of science, on the one hand, andquestions about evidence and justification, on the other. Kuhn was deliberatelymixing together things that the logical empiricists had insisted should be keptapart.
Scientists doing normal science agree on the fundamentals,they do not waste their time arguing about the most basic issues that arise intheir field.
Any “closing off” of debate is bad news according to Popper.Much of the secret of science, for Khun, is the remarkable balance it managesto strike between being too resistant to change in basic ideas, and not beingresistant enough.
Chapter 6 Khun and Revolutions
The drivers for paradigm shifts: In Khun’s story, large-scalescientific change usually requires both a crisis and the appearance of a newcandidate paradigm. But the idea that revolutions generally require crisesraised some hard historical issues. See examples from the scientificrevolution. The author claims that the sudden appearance of problem-solvingpower is the spark to the revolution.
Principles of science: There are some core ways of assessingtheories that are common to all paradigms. When these principles were expressedin a broad enough way to be common across all of science, they would be sovague that they would be powerless to settle hard cases. Within a singleparadigm, more precise ways of assessing hypotheses will operate. They will bemore like habits and values shared by normal scientists.
Different paradigms in a field are incommensurable to eachother. Looking within a period of normal science, progress is evident as timegoes by. Across a revolutionary divide, it will not be clear whether there hasbeen progress from earlier to later. It might not even be clear how to comparethe theories or pieces of work at all. Khun’s response: Our present paradigmshave more problem-solving power than earlier paradigms did.
Two reasons for the incommensurability of differentparadigms: 1) people in different paradigms will not be able to fullycommunicate with each other (which the author thinks lacks historical evidence);2) the incommensurability of standards. Example from biology: The biometriciansthought that a mathematically formulated law was the right goal, while WilliamBateson, in the Mendelian camp, argued that understanding the mechanism ofinheritance was the goal.
Chapter 7 Lakatos, Laudan, Feyerabend, and Frameworks
The philosophers in the chapter tried to explain how scienceprogresses.
Is scientific change one-process or two-process (within andat the level of frameworks)
Lakatos & research programs
more than one research programs per field per time. Thelarge-scale processes of scientific change = competition between researchprograms.
A progressive research program is one that is succeeding inincreasing its predictive power. A degenerating research program is one that isfalling behind, or only barely keeping up, in its attempt to deal withanomalies.
It is acceptable to protect a research program for a while,during a period when it is degenerating. It might recover.
For Lakatos, Khun presented scientific change as afundamentally irrational process, a matter of “mob psychology”, a process wherethe loudest, most energetic, and most numerous voices would prevail regardlessof reasons.
Laudan & research traditions
Two different attitudes to theories and research traditionsfound in science: acceptance & pursuit.
It is always rational to pursue the research tradition thathas the highest current rate of progress in problem-solving. But that does notmean one should accept the basic ideas of that research tradition.
Feyerabend & epistemological anarchism
Great scientists are opportunistic and creative, willing tomake use of any available technique for discovery and persuasion. Any attemptto establish rules of method in science will result only in a straitjacketingof this creativity.
Feyerabend saw Khun as glorifying the mind-numbing routineof normal science and the rigid education that Kuhn thought produced a goodnormal scientist. Feyerabend, has gone from being an ally of freedom to beingan enemy. Scientists are turning into “human ants,” entirely unable to thinkoutside of their training.
Feyerabend admired the scientific adventures of thescientific revolution. Especially Galileo.